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Private Land Use, Changing Public Values, 
and Notions of Relativity 
Lynda L. Butler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Government regulation of land use is becoming 
increasingly more extensive and demanding. Growing scientific 
evidence of the link between environmental quality and land 
use and greater appreciation of the ecological value of natural 
resources have provided much of the impetus for government's 
intensified regulatory efforts. Widespread public demand for 
environmental quality also appears to have had a positive 
effect on government's willingness to regulate land use. For 
example, recent opinion polls indicate strong public support for 
expanded environmental regulation. 1 
The types of land use regulations adopted by government 
vary widely in purpose, form, and methodology. Some 
regulations impose conditions on otherwise permissible land 
uses, while others prohibit uses once allowed by law.2 One 
type of land use regulation frequently adopted by localities is 
the growth control measure. This type of regulation typically 
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Expectations, Public Promises, and Land Use" held in December 1990 at the 
University of Virginia and sponsored by the Institute for Environmental 
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the College's support. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of 
Della Harris and her word processing staff and to thank Craig Holmes for his 
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1. See, e.g., Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay, Survey Finds Support for Bay 
Cleanup, Land Use Controls, 1 BAY J., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 3; Joe Barrett, Poll: 
Environment a State Concern, DAILY PRESS (Williamsburg, Va.), May 31, 1990, at 
A1; George Gallup, Jr., & Alec Gallup, Many Feel Environmental Fears Unshared, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 12, 1990, at A-10. 
2. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 1.02-.10 (2d ed. 
1988) (discussing the different types of land use controls). 
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restricts or prohibits :future development options of private 
landowners and generally represents government's response to 
pressing social problems or changing public values.3 Other 
popular forms of land use regulation include aesthetic zoning, 
like billboard regulation and historic preservation laws,4 and 
environmental controls, like wetlands acts and coastal 
development laws adopted to protect critical environmental 
resources. 5 'Regardless of the type of land use regulation, the 
effect on private landowners generally remains the same: 
private landowners, expectations of present and future land use 
are restricted, altered, or even defeated. 
The reactions of private property owners to expanded land 
use regulation are predictable. Private parties who purchase 
land in expectation of future development and use are 
understandably upset when government interferes with their 
expectations. With increasing frequency, these private parties 
are challenging land use regulations as impermissible 
violations of legally protected property rights. 6 All too often the 
challenges fail. Under current law, private landowners 
generally are not entitled to legal protection when well-tailored 
land use regulations cause a diminution in value, sometimes 
not even when the diminution is significant. 
As a general matter, a government regulation will 
withstand scrutiny under constitutional provisions protecting 
property rights as long as the regulation "substantially 
advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not deprive the 
property owner of all "economically viable use."7 Sometimes, 
3. See generally id. §§ 1.07, 10.01-.12 (discussing growth controls). 
4. See generally id. §§ 1.06, 11.01-.34 (discussing aesthetic regulation). 
5. See generally id. §§ 12.01-.13 (discussing environmental controls). Some 
types of land use controls may fall into more than one category. Wetlands 
regulations, for example, may be adopted to control growth as well as to preserve 
critical environmental resources. 
6. Most, if not all, of the challenges invoke the protection of the Takings and 
Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. The Takings Clause 
prohibits government from taldng private property "for public use, without just 
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clauses protect against 
government deprivations of property without due process of law. Id. amends. V, 
XIV. For examples of recent challenges, see Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental 
Programs: A Study in Political Influence and Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 823, 832 n.33, 833 n.3•l (1990). 
7. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Last term the United 
States Supreme Court considered the question of whether a taking results when an 
environmental regulation deprives a beachfront landowner of all economically viable 
use. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding 
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when a landowner has relied on a prior land use regulatory 
scheme to pursue plans for future use, a court will declare the 
landowner's rights to be "vested'' and therefore protected from 
government interference under principles of equity.8 But even 
this form of protection often is limited to situations involving 
good faith reliance by a landowner on government approval of 
the landowner's development plans.9 
The schism between private expectations and current law 
suggests the need to evaluate the legitimacy of those 
expectations. Of particular concern is the question of whether 
the law should protect private land use expectations from 
changes in legal rules, public values, and societal demands. 
This article suggests that private expectations do not merit 
protection as constitutional property just because a government 
regulation has diminished the ability of property owners to 
realize their expectations. Government efforts to impose well-
tailored ecological or other social obligations on private 
landowners should, as a general matter, be legitimate under 
constitutional and common law property principles so long as 
the government action addresses adverse consequences of 
private land use and does not deprive landowners of all 
economically viable use. Private economic value cannot be the 
sole determinant of the legal validity of a government land use 
regulation. Other factors, including public preferences and 
political and scientific concerns, must play a role in 
determining whether private land use expectations merit 
that a regulatory taking results upon total deprivation of economically viable use 
unless the regulatory action is based on limitations inherent in a landowner's title). 
This article does not specifically consider that question, but rather focuses on the 
general constitutional legitimacy of changes in laws affecting private property 
rights. For further discussion of the recent decision's implications for 
constitutionally protected property, see infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text. 
8. See generally 7 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 
§ 52.08[4][b] (1992) (discussing the vested rights doctrine, as well as a related 
theory, equitable estoppel). Although court decisions might suggest otherwise, the 
vested rights doctrine appears to have a constitutional foundation. See MANDELKER, 
supra note 2, § 6.12. For an argument that constitutional analysis should be 
applied to the vested rights doctrine and other similar judicial theories developed 
to protect property rights, see CHARLES L. SIEMON EI' AL., VESTED RIGHTS 56-68 
(1982). 
9. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, · Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 
801 (Va. 1972). For a discussion of the circumstances under which landowners may 
claim equitable estoppel or vested rights to protect their property interests from 
changes in land use regulations, see MANDELKER, supra note 2, §§ 6.13-.15; 7 
ROHAN, supra note 8, § 52.08[4)[b). 
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protection as fundamental property rights. Constitutionally 
protected property rights, in other words, should be relative, 
varying over time in J:esponse to the totality of facts and 
circumstances surroundiing use of resources. 
II. PRIVATg LAND USE EXPECTATIONS 
Tensions over government land use regulations exist 
largely because property owners generally expect to have the 
freedom to do what they want with their land. Landowners 
typically believe that o·wnership rights include the right to use 
their land as they choose, provided such use is consistent with 
certain traditional legal principles. Because those principles 
generally reflect a laissez-faire approach, typically regulating 
land use only to the extent necessary to separate incompatible 
uses, 10 landowners have come to expect almost "absolute use" 
powers. Though landowners may recognize government's 
authority to designate where uses may occur, landowners 
generally expect to have the freedom to exploit their land 
within the designated area11 and tend to resist government 
efforts to impose further use restrictions. Under this "absolute" 
or "exploitative use" expectation, then, landowners question 
government's power to regulate land use beyond the traditional 
use separation format, at least without the payment of just 
compensation. 12 
Property owners are especially troubled by land use 
regulations that have an economic impact. Most, if not all, of 
the recently enacted land use regulations fall into this category 
because they either impose new restrictions on use or make 
those restrictions more stringent. When the legal rules 
10. See gerwrally MANDELRER, supra note 2, §§ 1.03-.10, 5.01 (discussing 
traditional and modern zoning techniques). 
11. Cf. Donald W. Large, 'l"'his Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of 
Land as Property, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 1039, 1042-45 (describing how this view 
developed among the early settJ.;rs). 
12. Evidence of the absolute use expectation can be found in the numerous 
lawsuits filed by private landowners against government units adopting more 
stringent land use restrictions. For some examples of those lawsuits, see Butler, 
supra note 6, at 832-34 & nn.33-34, 841-42 & nn.65-66. Evidence also can be found 
in numerous newspaper accounta of opposition to government efforts to adopt more 
stringent land use regulations. See, e.g., Nathaniel Axtell, Taxpayers to Foot New 
Rules on Bay, VA. GAZE'ITE, Sept. 20, 1989, at 5A (where one opponent of a new 
environmental law describes tbe law as 'just one more instance of taking an 
American freedom away from us" and asks who is "more important, man or the 
environment?"). 
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governing land use are changed after property owners have 
purchased their land, the rules will necessarily affect the 
owners' expectations. Because private landowners generally 
expect to have the freedom to exploit their land, the 
landowners typically become outraged when government does 
not compensate them for economic loss caused by changes in 
use restrictions.13 
Although the law no longer supports the traditional 
expectation of absolute use, 14 the law still tolerates and 
sometimes even encourages a landowner's exploitative 
tendencies. 15 More often than not, for example, landowners 
are allowed to develop land and to seek a profit from their 
initial land investment.16 Perhaps because of the law's 
tolerance for a landowner's exploitative tendencies, many 
landowners continue to believe their expectation of absolute 
use merits constitutional protection as a property right. 
13. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) 
(where a landowner sued because a state law extinguished his property value); 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (where a 
landowner sued because a· state law diminished the value of his property). 
14. In the early 1900s, the United States Supreme Court recognized the power 
of government to modifY, to a certain extent, existing property rights and 
expectations. As Justice Holmes explained, "Government hardly could go on if to 
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 413 (1922). One important source of traditional support for the exploitative 
use expectation can be found in early land distribution laws encouraging settlement 
and development. For examples of such laws, see LYNDA L. BUTLER & MARGIT 
LIVINGSTON, VmGINIA TIDAL AND COAsrAL LAW ch. 8 (1988). 
15. Just because the law no longer supports the traditional absolute use 
expectation, that does not mean the expectation does not exist. In many areas of 
the country, for example, the expectation continues to exist because local and state 
governments have only recently begun to regulate land use for environmental 
purposes. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 6, at 863-65 (discussing recent Chesapeake 
Bay legislation). Further, even when environmental land use regulations have been 
adopted, they often reflect compromises made to appease op_ponents. See, e.g., id. at 
881-83, 885-86 (discussing some exemptions and omissions found in state 
environmental legislation). Thus, although the law, as a general matter, does not 
affll'lllatively support continued adherence to the traditional absolute use 
expectation, the absence of environmentally aggressive regulation has, in many 
areas, indirectly encouraged such adherence. 
16. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992) 
(deciding that government regulation cannot deprive a landowner of all 
economically beneficial use unless the regulation is directed at use interests· not 
originally part of the landowner's title); Butler, supra note 6, at 875-77, 890-91, 
909-10, 923-25. But see Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 769-70 (Wis. 
1972) (upholding a shoreland zoning ordinance which prevented affected landowners 
from changing the natural character of land located in certain areas without a 
special permit). 
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The Supreme Court's opinion in the 1992 decision Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council17 provides clear evidence of 
the law's continuing support for a landowner's exploitative 
tendencies. In Lucas, the Court concluded that a regulation 
denying a landowner "all economically beneficial or productive 
use" merited categorical treatment as a taking and did not 
require a "case-specific inquiry into the public interest 
advanced in support" of the regulation.18 The only way the 
regulation could "resist compensation" would be if an "inquiry 
into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed 
use interests" were not originally part of the landowner's 
title;19 that is, the regulatory action must be based on 
limitations inherent in the landowner's title or in ''background 
principles" of property or nuisance law. 20 In explaining the 
Court's categorical treatment of regulations that deny all 
economically viable use, Justice Scalia relied in part on Coke's 
query: " '[F]or what is the land but the profits thereofi?]' '.'21 
'Vhen Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia for assuming 
"that the only uses of property cognizable under the 
Constitution are developmental uses,"22 Justice Scalia denied 
making such an assumption. He explained that "[t]hough our 
prior takings cases evince an abiding concern for the productive 
use of, and economic investment in, land, there are plainly a 
number of noneconomic interests in land whose impairment 
vrul invite exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings 
Clause."23 Af3 an example, he cited a case protecting the right 
to exclude.24 
Justice Scalia's response does not adequately rebut Justice 
Stevens's argument. In Justice Scalia's own words, the Court is 
concluding that a landowner who ''has been called upon ... to 
leave his property economically idle . . . has suffered a 
taking."25 Furthermore, the only noneconomic interest that 
Justice Scalia identifies is the right to exclude. Although that 
17. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
18. Id. at 2893. 
19. Id. at 2899. 
20. Id. at 2900. 
21. ld. at 2894 (quoting 1 Sm EDWARD COKE, INSI'ITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812)). 
22. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
23. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8. 
24. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
436 (1982)). 
25. Id. at 2895. 
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right is noneconomic in the sense that the right does not focus 
on any particular use or economic interest, the right to exclude 
is central to a landowner's power to decide how and when to 
use his property. 26 By protecting the right to exdude, the 
Court is protecting a property owner's power to take economic 
gambles. More often than not, the property owner decides to 
exercise that power. Thus, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's 
protests, the decision in Lucas reveals a philosophic approach 
to property that is strongly tied to traditional views. 
Whether a landowner's expectations of profit and 
exploitation deserve protection as property rights depends in 
large part on the reasonableness of the expectations. Long ago, 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham defined property as "nothing but 
a basis of expectation" founded on the. law-an "established" 
expectation of gain derived from and made predictable and 
secure by the law.27 The legal system has incorporated 
Bentham's notion of established expectations into basic 
concepts of property. Among other factors, traditional case law 
focuses on the reasonableness of expectations in determining 
whether property rights have been violated by private or 
government action.28 The Court's recent decision in Lucas 
appears to elevate, or at least reinvigorate, the role of 
reasonable expectations in takings jurisprudence. Justice Scalia 
explains that the Court's takings jurisprudence "has 
traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens 
regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 
'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to 
property."29 In Justice Scalia's view, government action 
26. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONO~fiC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1 (3d 
ed. 1986) (discussing exclusivity and the other key attributes of property). 
27. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (lOth ed. 1896). 
28. Traditional common law principles governing water use in the East, for 
example, include a reasonable use standard to resolve conflicts among users. See 
generally Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian 
Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 95, 125-37 (1985) (discussing the reasonable use standard). 
Additionally, one of the factors considered by the Supreme Court in determining 
whether government has impermissibly taken private property iJ the 
reasonableness of investment-backed expectations. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
For further discussion of the role of Bentham in defining common law and 
constitutional property, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1165, 1211-13 (1967). 
29. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992). 
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depriving a landowner of all economically valuable use is 
"inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the 
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional 
culture."30 This language reveals how closely property and 
takings law are bound up with the reasonable expectations of 
landowners. 
Evaluating the reasonableness of private land use 
expectations requires a better understanding of the sources of 
those expectations. On.ce the origins of the absolute use 
expectation are identified, the legitimacy of private 
expectations can then be examined. Expectations based on 
invalid or obsolete facts and circumstances require close 
scrutiny. As the following discussion suggests, this evaluation 
process necessarily must involve consideration of competing 
third party or public values. 
A. Origins of Private Land Use Expectations 
Over the years, numerous cultural, legal, and political 
factors have shaped attitudes about property rights, skewing 
perceptions about resource use and management in favor of 
private rights and expectations. This influence is especially 
apparent in the area of land use regulation. Government ad-
ministrators, legislators, and jurists routinely demonstrate a 
private rights orientation, often erring on the side of private 
land use expectations in weighing government options for regu-
lation. 31 To this day, people from all walks of life still believe 
in the sanctity of private land ownership and assume that 
landowners have virtually absolute rights of use and control. 32 
Natural use and undeveloped land, in other words, are rarely 
viewed as normal either in our property system or in our soci-
ety.3a 
One cultural factor that has contributed to the develop-
ment of our private rights orientation, especially our exploit-
ative tendencies, is the early American bias against the wilder-
ness. Known as the "pioneer tradition," this cultural bias 
:30. Id. at 2900. 
:n. Legislators, for example, often include broad exemptions in environmental 
laws affecting landowners, see Butler, supra note 6, at 881-83, 885-86, while courts 
tend to interpret those laws from a traditional private property perspective, see id. 
at 896-97. 
32. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text. 
33. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. 
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evolved from the belief that wilderness needed to be developed 
and conquered to ensure man's physical and moral survival.34 
Although American society no longer adheres to this belief, the 
cultural bias against wilderness has, by now, become firmly 
engrained in the concept of private property.35 
A tradition of private land management has further con-
tributed to the private rights bias. During the colonial and 
early statehood periods, this tradition appears to have existed 
in several American jurisdictions. In Virginia and New York, 
for example, early systems of land distribution resulted in the 
concentration of landholdings in the hands of relatively few 
people. 36 The owners of these landholdings often decided to 
leave their holdings undeveloped for long periods of time.37 
Although resource protection did not necessarily motivate these 
decisions, it was, at the very least, an incidental benefit. 38 To-
day landowners have become too numerous and resource man-
agement problems too complex for the tradition of private re-
source protection to be effective in most contexts. 
Legal and political factors have also contributed to the 
development of the private rights orientation, including the 
exploitative use expectation.39 The prominence of private 
34. RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 24, 239 (3d ed. 
1982). As Nash explained: 
Two components figured in the American pioneer's bias against wil-
derness. On the direct, physical level, it constituted a· formidable threat to 
his very survival . . . . Safety and comfort, even necessities like food and 
shelter, depended on overcoming the wild environment .... The pioneer, 
in short, lived too close to wilderness for appreciation. Understandably, 
his attitude was hostile and his dominant criteria utilitarian. The con-
quest of wilderness was his major concern. 
Wilderness not only frustrated the pioneers physically but also ac-
quired significance as a dark and sinister symbol. They shared the long 
Western tradition of imagining wild country as a moral vacuum, a cursed 
and chaotic wasteland. As a consequence, frontiersmen acutely sensed that 
they battled wild country not only for personal survival but in the name 
of nation, race, and God. 
Id. at 24. Others have referred to this cultural bias as the "cowboy mentality" or 
"cowboy economy." See Large, supra note 11, at 1043-44 & n.22. 
35. Butler, supra note 6, at 839 & n.58. 
36. Id. at 839 n.59. 
37. Lax enforcement of settlement and development conditions imposed on colo-
nial land grants encouraged this practice. See generally BUTLER & LMNGSTON, 
supra note 14, § 8.1 (discussing colonial land distribution in Virginia). Eventually 
state land distribution acts allowed land to be held absolutely and unconditionally. 
See, e.g., id. § 8.3, at 279. 
38. Butler, supra note 6, at 839 n.59. 
39. Another factor that sustains the private rights perspective is the reluctance 
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property in our Constitution has played a significant role in 
this development process. Besides prohibiting government de-
privations of property without due process of law,40 the Con-
stitution also prevents government from taking private proper-
ty for public use without payment of just compensation.41 
Some scholars have arb:rued that the Takings Clause represents 
a victory for the Madisonian political camp,42 which viewed 
property rights as "inviolabl[e]" and called for an individual 
rights approach to constitutional interpretation.43 
Even if this view is not correct, it is nevertheless clear that 
the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Constitution recog-
nize the fundamental importance of the private property con-
cept. As Charles Reich once stated in a now famous description 
of the relationship between property and civil liberties, the 
freedoms recognized in the Bill of Rights "must have a basis in 
property," or they will not be preserved.44 ''Political rights pre-
suppose that individuals and private groups have the will and 
the means to act independently.'J45 Property thus serves the 
important function of maintaining a person's independence by 
drawing a "zone of privacy'' around the individual.46 Within 
that zone, the individual is "master" and the majority must 
"yield to the owner."'17 Given the constitutional stature of 
of nonlegislative bodies to alter fundamental legal and political rights such as 
property rights. This reluctance prevents quick changes in property rights. See 
generally Butler, supra note 6,. at 854-60 (discussing the political question doctrine 
as a legal obstacle to judicial activism). 
40. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
41. Id. amend. V. 
42. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN at x, 15-1~' (1985) (discussing the political philosophy of the 
takings clause); see also Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a 
''Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 KAN. L. REV. 529, 536 (1989) (discussing 
the modern federalist view). 
43. James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZE'ITE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted zn 14 
JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAHES MADISON 266-68 (Robert Rutland et al. 
eds., 1983); see also Anderson, supra note 42, at 534. For a thoughtful discussion 
of the importance of the Madisonian preoccupation with property to American 
constitutionalism, see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990). For discussion and interpretation of the main 
opposing view, the Jeffersonian or social good view, see RICHARD K. MATI'HEWS, 
THE RADICAL POLITICS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1984); GARRE'IT W. SHELDON, THE 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1991); Anderson, supra note 42, at 
531-33; infra text accompanying note 101. 
44. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 778. 
47. Id. at 771. 
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property, the development of a private rights bias and an abso-
lute use expectation is not at all surprising. 
The traditional common law system also has encouraged 
the development of the absolute use expectation. During the 
era of "liberty of contract," the judiciary generally protected 
private contractual arrangements from government interfer-
ence. Eventually, as the concept of "freedom of contract" be-
came well accepted, private parties came to expect the same 
freedom for land transactions.48 Additionally, after the Ameri-
can Revolution, states allowed individual landowners to hold 
their property interests free of most if not all of the affirmative 
obligations that traditionally were owed to a grantor simply 
because of that party's prior interest.49 Together with the de-
velopment of freedom of contract, this land reform helped foster 
the view that land was a commodity to be bought or sold in the 
marketplace just like any other economic asset. 50 
Long-standing land use practices have further reinforced 
the exploitative view of private landowners. Until fairly recent-
ly, many localities had engaged in little, if any, land use regu-
lation. 51 Furthermore, even when localities adopted land use 
regulations, the localities generally focused on use separation, 
and not on use restriction.52 This tradition of minimal land 
use regulation has created the false expectation in landowners 
that government will not significantly increase the burdens of 
land use regulation-at least not without payment of just com-
pensation. 53 
48. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 275-
79, 412-14, 532-36 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the development of contracts and land 
law); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 
160-210 (1977) (discussing the development of contracts law). 
49. Butler, supra note 6, at 841 & n.62. Although some states apparently still 
. retain the tenure concept, there now is little, if any, practical difference between 
states that have not affirmatively abolished the last vestiges of tenure and those 
that have. See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 9 (2d ed. 1988). See generally 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. 
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 229-
406 (2d ed. 1959) (discussing the feudal land system). 
50. Butler, supra note 6, at 841 & n.63. 
51. See, e.g., id. at 875-77, 923-24 (discussing problems with local government 
regulation in Virginia). 
52. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 2, §§ 1.03-.10, 5.01 (discussing tradi-
tional and modern zoning techniques). 
53. The Supreme Court's decision in Lucas u. South Carolina Coastal Council 
clarifies that compensation is generally owed if government increases the burden of 
land use regulation to the point of eliminating all economically viable use. 112 S. 
Ct. 2886, 2895, 2899-900, 2901-02 (1992). To avoid compensation in such a situa-
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Although the traditional view of property may be under-
standable from a cultural, legal, and political perspective, it 
represents an incomplete and biased view of the concept of 
property. Among other problems, the traditional view has an 
unnecessarily narrow and one-sided focus, ignoring important 
economic and noneconomic values. Given the ecological interre-
latedness of natural resources, this one-dimensional perspective 
makes no sense. As the following discussion explains, legiti-
mate private use expectations must be grounded in a more 
holistic view of land use. 
B. The Need for a Holistic View of Land Use 
The private expectation of absolute use has one serious 
flaw: it adopts a narrow view of the world, ignoring a number 
of factors critical to the resource allocation process. This limit-
ed perspective has two related but distinct effects on the alloca-
tion process. First, the narrow view artificially constrains the 
content of the value sy.stem used to allocate property interests. 
Under the exploitative view of property, this value system 
focuses almost exclusively on concerns important to individual 
landowners. Though a landowner's concerns might implicate a 
variety of values ranging from economic to moral, the values 
are primarily defined from the perspective and self-interests of 
the landowner. Second, the narrow view tends to unnecessarily 
limit the scope of land. use decisions to the interaction of the 
individual landowner with the challenged regulation. Although 
the public interest generally is considered in the land use plan-
ning process,54 many significant land use decisions actually 
are made in the context of an individual landowner's challenge 
to a particular regulation. Because of the dispute-oriented na-
ture of our judicial process, land use decisions developed 
through the judicial process tend to exclude from consideration 
the relationship between the private landowner and the public 
at large, as well as the relationship between the private land-
owner and other property owners. 55 This one-dimensional per-
tion, government must establish that the land use regulation "inhere[s] in the title 
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the . . . law of property and 
nuisance already place upon land ownership." Id. at 2900. 
54. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 2, §§ 3.01-.24 (discussing the land use 
planning process). 
55. See infra notes 69-72 ~md accompanying text. Third parties, such as neigh-
boring property owners and citizens, must establish standing to challenge land use 
regulations. See MANDELKER, supra note 2, § 8.02. Many state courts require third 
629] PRIVATE LAND USE 641 
spective thus ignores the interrelatedness of land and other 
natural resources and of users and nonusers. 
Both problems can be demonstrated by a cursory examina-
tion of the economic values underlying the exploitative view. 
Private landowners adopting such a view will often reluctantly 
accept environmental regulations, like pollution controls, if the 
costs of complying with the regulations can be passed on to the 
public through some sort of price adjustment in the market-
place. These landowners will contest, nonetheless, other envi-
ronmental regulations, like many wetlands use restrictions, 
because the costs of compliance cannot be similarly re-
couped. 56 This approach basically relegates the question of the 
legal validity of land use regulations to the status of an individ-
ual business decision; under the absolutist view of property, the 
validity question is addressed primarily from the economic 
perspective of the individual landowner, and other relevant 
values are generally ignored. 
The absolutist view, for example, ignores the values of 
third parties who prefer environmentally sound land use even 
when a private landowner cannot pass on the costs of achieving 
such land use. Those opposing aggressive land use regulations 
often respond to this concern by stressing that, if the value of 
the public preference for environmentally sound land use is 
high enough, the public can buy out the landowner's use 
right.57 This response ignores serious externality problems 
parties to establish " 'special' damage to an interest or property right that is differ-
ent from the damage the general public suffers from a zoning restriction." Id. § 
8.02, at 317. As a general matter, state courts conclude that special damage "oc-
curs only to property that is close enough to be affected." Id. § 8.04, at 319. Fear 
of harmful effects often is not sufficient to confer standing. Id. at 318-19. See gen-
erally id. §§ 8.01-.07 (discussing third-party standing in state court). Although the 
trend has been to grant standing to organizations on the basis of environmental 
injury, id. § 8.06, recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that environmental 
groups will have a difficult time establishing injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (holding that environmental groups lacked stand-
ing, even though members had a cognizable interest in preserving endangered 
species, because members did not show actual and imminent injury); Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (denying standing to a group whose 
members claimed recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of land in the vicinity of 
land affected by agency actions because evidence was insufficient to establish that 
members' interests were actually affected). 
56. Wetlands regulations typically control the size, location, and diversity of 
land uses, making it difficult for a landowner to pass on the costs of compliance as 
a use cost. See, e.g., MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1807(a), -1808(b), (d) (1990) 
(establishing a 1000-foot buffer zone around Chesapeake Bay waters for special 
environmental regulation). 
57. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95 
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existing in the environmental and land use area. 58 An 
externality is a "cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of 
one or more people imposes or confers on a third party or par-
ties without their consent."59 In the environmental and land 
use context, externality problems arise in part because public 
preferences are too diffused and small for the public's needs to 
be met through marketplace transactions. No single member of 
the public typically has enough of an interest to prompt that 
person to act on the public's collective preference. Furthermore, 
even when someone has a strong interest, that person often 
prefers not to seek legal protection of the interest because of 
the free benefits other members of the public would receive 
from the action. 60 
Private landowners can claim, in response to this argu-
ment, that if an individual landowner has to bear the costs of 
ensuring environmentally sensitive land use, third parties who 
(1992); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 
193 A.2d 232, 240 (N.J. 1963); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68, 
770-71 (Wis. 1972). 
58. Although the existence of market problems in the environmental area is 
generally not disputed, schol11rs disagree about the moral, economic, and political 
implications of these problems. Compare Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and En· 
forcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 19-20 (1964) (arguing that effi-
ciency concerns justify a private rights approach in most market failure situations) 
with Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custam, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) (arguing for an expanded public 
rights approach to the market failure problem). See generally FREDERICK R. ANDER-
SON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOl\fiC INCENTIVES 3-6, 21-
28 (1977) (discussing market failure in the environmental context and suggesting a 
pricing approach); A. MYRICK FREEMAN ET AL., THE ECONOl\fiCS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POUcY (1973) (discussing the economic implications of the market failure problem); 
DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 4-22 (1990) (discussing different economic schools and models of 
environmental management); Mark Sagoff~ Economic Theory and Environmental 
Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981) (criticizing economic analysis of environmental 
problems and arguing for a broader perspective on environmental regulation). This 
scholarly debate seems to have had little effect on private land use expectations. 
General scholarly agreement about the existence of a market failure in the envi-
ronmental area, for example, has not prevented private landowners from becoming 
upset with land use restrictions designed to correct the failure. Even when land-
owners recognize the external environmental costs of private land use, they often 
resist regulation because of the economic impact on private rights and the public 
benefits resulting from regulation. For further discussion of the constitutional impli-
cations of these two factors, Bee infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text. 
59. ROBER!' COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOl\fiCS 45 (1988). 
60. See ANDERSON El' AL., supra note 58, at 26-27 (discussing some of the rea-
sons for externalities in the environmental context); Joseph L. Sax, Why We Will 
Not (Should Not) Sell the Public Lands: Changing Conceptions of Private Property, 
1983 UTAH L. REV. 313, 322-23 (discussing externalities involving public values). 
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prefer such use would be freeriding on the landowner. Although 
some scholars have supported this argument, 61 it still does not 
adequately account for the significant marketplace problems 
facing members of the public who prefer environmentally sound 
land use. 62 In addition, the landowners' response in effect ig-
nores the external costs of private land use-that is, the costs 
to third parties of private land use decisions. Because the mar-
ketplace traditionally does not account for environmental pref-
erences, private landowners do not have any incentive to mini-
mize the environmental costs of their land use choices through 
self-restraint; third parties already bear those costs involun-
tarily.sa 
As the formal representative of the public at large, govern-
ment admittedly can overcome some externality problems by 
exercising its power of eminent domain to force an exchange of 
a private landowner's use rights for just compensation. Howev-
er, this solution will occur only when government decides to 
recognize and promote the public preference. Additionally, the 
eminent domain solution ignores the external costs imposed by 
private landowners on third parties generally. 64 As the exten-
siveness and the seriousness of these costs become more appar-
ent, a growing number of people are resisting the proposition 
that government must pay landowners to minimize their exter-
nal land use costs. 65 
Although it may not be desirable to force private landown-
ers to consider all the costs of land use decisions, the appropri-
ate economic solution should not allow private landowners to 
totally ignore the external costs of their use. Such a unilateral 
and one-dimensional solution should not be allowed-at least 
not when the marketplace fails to account for the preferences of 
61. Cf, Demsetz, supra note 58, at 19-20 (arguing for the exclusion of freeriders 
through a private rights approach in many public goods situations). 
62. For additional marketplace problems, see infra notes 85-98 and accompany-
ing text. 
63. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-
45 (1968) (discussing the serious consequences of externalities). 
64. The Eminent Domain Clause is also known as the Takings or Just Com-
pensation Clause. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. In determining just 
compensation, courts only focus on the value of the "taken" property. See 4 Juuus 
L. SACKMAN & PATRICK J. ROHAN, NICHOlS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01 (3d ed. 
1990). 
65. The increasing aggressiveness of state legislatures in regulating land uses 
that destroy or injure critical environmental resources demonstrates this point. See 
generally Butler, supra note 6 (discussing state environmental programs). 
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a significant number of people and when private economic 
choices have serious or high external costs. Though an effective 
environmental program will significantly benefit the public, 
government's decision to adopt the program cannot and should 
not be compared to normal marketplace choices. 
In contrast to the typical voluntary marketplace transac-
tion, government's decision to adopt environmental land use 
regulations is, for all practical purposes, involuntary. Govern-
ment is forced into adopting the regulations because of the 
serious external costs of private land use; in ecological terms, 
government must engage in extensive land use regulation to 
avert the tragedy of the commons.66 Government must at-
tempt to force private parties to internalize land use costs 
when land use has a detrimental and long-term effect on third 
parties and on the health of remaining natural resources. The 
mere status of being a landowner should not be the sole deter-
minant of the content of the economic values used to allocate 
costs and benefits between private landowners and third par-
ties.67 
The artificially constrained value system and one-dimen-
sional perspective of the private rights approach to property is 
somewhat understandable given the historical development of 
property law and, more specifically, of land use law. The courts 
traditionally have defined the scope and meaning of private 
property rights. 68 The focus of a court is inherently limited to 
the dispute raised by the parties before it. 69 In the context of 
land use regulations, such a dispute typically involves the gov-
ernment regulator and the individual landowner challenging 
the regulation. Although the courts can, in the context of the 
particular dispute, consider public policies implicated by the 
66. The tragedy of the commons refers to the ecological roin that results when 
resources are available for common use without regard for the costs of use. For a 
discussion of the tr~gedy of fo.e commons, see Hardin, supra note 63. 
67. Of course, the mere status of being a landowner does carry significant legal 
implications, including constitutional consequences. For further discussion of some 
of those consequences, see infra notes 99-117, 129-57 and accompanying text. 
68. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining how property can tend "to become what courts 
say it is"); ROGER A. CUNNlNGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.3, 1.5 
(1984) (discussing the common law basis of American property law). See generally 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) (discussing 
the processes by which judges decide cases). 
69. For a discussion of the role of the courts in the environmental context, see 
Butler, supra note 6, at 854-60, 893-906. 
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dispute, 70 many courts are reluctant to assume the role of ac-
tively defining and developing public policy. 71 In the view of 
these jurists, public policymaking is a task more comfortably 
left to democratically responsive government officials. In addi-
tion to ensuring that a politically acceptable policy choice is 
made, these officials are, in the opinion of some, better able to 
develop comprehensive solutions to complex resource manage-
ment problems. 72 
Furthermore, until fairly recently, public and private inter-
ests in land use overlapped significantly. Because of this 
country's historical abundance of land and because of its ongo-
ing need for economic growth, land use laws traditionally en-
couraged private settlement and use. 73 For many years, the 
public interest focused, like the private interest, on the settle-
ment, cultivation, and development of land. This congruence 
between public and private interests encouraged the develop-
ment of a false definition of property-a definition which 
equates private property with economic development and which 
results in the subordination of inconsistent public interests to 
private economic values. The close congruence between public 
land policy and private land rights has generally ceased to 
exist, largely because the conditions supporting unfettered 
development have vanished. Vast acres of undeveloped land 
and a sparse population have given way to a dwindling supply 
of land and overcrowded urban _areas. 74 Thus, instead of pro-
moting unfettered development, public land policy generally 
now seeks to control growth and manage the remaining unde-
veloped land. 75 Despite this change in public land policy, the 
legacy of the traditional approach remains; many landowners 
. still view their property rights as tantamount to economic free 
70. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (where the court con-
siders the privacy interests of migrant workers, as well as their access to govern-
ment services, in interpreting and limiting the private property rights of their 
employer). 
71. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 6, at 848-54, 893-904 (discussing the restrictive 
approach of some state courts). 
72. For further discussion of these views, see id. at 854-60, 893-906. 
73. See, e.g., BUTLER & LMNGSTON, supra note 14, ch. 8 (discussing land grant 
laws enacted during Virginia's colonial and early statehood periods). 
74. See WILWM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 8-9 (1977) 
(discussing the growing problem of ecological scarcity); Large, supra note 11, at 
1041-45 (discussing changing resource conditions). 
75. See 1 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW § 1.02[3] (1990 & Release #3, 1992) (discussing modem public nat-
ural resources law). 
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will and thus consider their rights to be superior to most public 
interests that are inconsistent with the exercise of that free 
will.76 
The present limitations of the traditional view of property 
suggest the need to redefine private land use expectations and 
ground them in a more holistic view of land use. 77 Under this 
holistic view, the relationship between private landowners and 
third parties would be e:ntitled to consideration in resolving dis-
putes over a particular owner's land use. A decisionmaker 
would no longer feel compelled to ignore the interrelatedness of 
individual tracts of land and other resources and of users and 
nonusers. The decisionrr1aker also would recognize that many of 
the bases for the private expectation of exploitative use devel-
oped in the context of facts and circumstances that no longer 
exist. Those courts reluctant to expand the dispute before them 
to consider third party values and interests would need to re-
think the nature of the common law, especially its inherent 
:t1exibility/8 and to identify concepts of common law property 
that capture that flexibility. 
Although this article does not purport to develop a compre-
hensive solution to the problems and issues raised above, it 
does offer some thoughts on how to begin the process of rede-
fining private land use expectations and resolving the tensions 
between private property rights and changing land use laws.79 
76. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
77. At least two members of the current Supreme Court appear to recognize 
the need for a holistic approach to defming private land use expectations. In his 
concurring opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Justice Kennedy 
deplores the Court for using "too narrow a confme for the exercise of regulatory 
power in a complex and interdependent society." 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). In his view, the "State should not be prevented from 
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts 
must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source." Id. Coastal 
property, for example, "may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system 
that the State can go further in regulating its development and use than the com-
mon law of nuisance might otherwise permit." Id. Justice Stevens also criticizes the 
Court's approach as "too narrow" and "too rigid." Id. at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). He explains that the Court's holding "effectively freezes the State's common 
law," id. at 2921~ and ignores the "evolving" nature of property rights, id. at 2922. 
In his view, the Court improperly assumed that "the only uses of property cogni-
zable under the Constitution are developmental uses." Id. at 2919 n.3. 
78. See CARDOZO, supra note 68, at 22-25 (discussing the flexible and evolving 
nature of the common law). 
79. Among other concerns, this process will require consideration of the follow-
ing questions: To what extent do existing rules of law generate reasonable expecta-
tions that merit protection by the legal system? What effect should changing re-
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At the core of these thoughts is the common law concept of 
relativity-the notion that property rights are relative and 
therefore vary in relation to the facts, circumstances, and inter-
ests implicated by a resource decision. Applying the relativity 
concept in the context of land use regulation will necessarily 
require recognition of public interests in privately owned land. 
III. PUBLIC VALUES AND 
REASONABLE LAND USE EXPECTATIONS 
Private land use decisions impact the public in a variety of 
ways. Some members of the public may own property that is 
adversely affected by a neighbor's land use. Filling in one 
owner's wetlands, for example, can result in. the flooding of 
neighboring lands and in the depositing of sediment on those 
lands. 80 Other members of the public may suffer more indirect 
effects. Though these third parties cannot point to any specific 
private property interest that is adversely affected, they never-
theless can demonstrate injury to their health, to a common 
resource, or more generally to the environment. The <;letrimen-
tal effects of industrial land use, for instance, are well docu-
mented and include short- and long-term threats to the public 
health, to air and water, and to the ecology of the affected 
area.81 Furthermore, a land use does not have to involve in-
dustrial processes to have a significant effect on the public at 
large. Even modest residential development in a historically 
important or environmentally sensitive area, for instance, can 
permanently destroy the historical value of the area or cause 
irreversible ecological damage.82 Uncontrolled residential de-
velopment can also overtax the infrastructure of an area, 
straining community resources like roads and police or fire pro-
tection. 
source conditions and new scientific knowledge have on private land rights? Should 
private landowners bear, as an incident of their ownership rights, a social obliga-
tion to exercise their rights in a way that minimizes, or at least considers, the 
costs to third parties? 
80. See generally NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM, PROTECTING AMERICA'S 
WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA 9-15 (1988) (discussing the functions of wetlands 
and the effects of alterations). 
81. See, e.g., U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALTI'Y, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 29-42 
(1970) (discussing the sources and effects of water pollution). 
82. See, e.g., LoWER JAMES RIVER Ass'N, RoUTE 5: A VIRGINIA BYwAY (1990) 
(discussing ways to protect historic Route 5 from modern growth and development). 
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By recognizing the legitimacy of at least some of these 
third party interests, the law would be correcting some of the 
economic, political, and ecological failures of the private proper-
ty system. 83 Even under an effective economic and political 
structure, imperfections in the process for expressing private 
and public preferences· will arise. To the extent that significant 
imperfections are identified, some effort should be made to 
correct them. Though the Constitution protects property rights 
from arbitrary government deprivations, uncompensated confis-
cations for public use, and unlimited regulation in the public 
interest, the Constitution does not prevent government from 
readjusting the private property system to accommodate both 
private and public inte:rests in valuable or vital resources.84 
A. Recognizing the Public Interest in Private Land Use 
When viewed in light of the need for a holistic approach, 
land use laws serve an important corrective function: reallocat-
ing land use rights to account for third party interests ignored 
by the traditional private property system. This corrective 
function can be justified from an economic, political, and ecolog-
ical perspective. Though a detailed discussion of each perspec-
tive is beyond the scope of this article, a more limited discus-
sion suggests the importance of the corrective function in the 
private land use context. By evaluating traditional land use ex-
pectations under each perspective, significant weaknesses of 
the traditional approach are highlighted, their adverse effects 
on third party or public interests are demonstrated, and the 
case for recognizing the public interest in private land use is 
thus advanced. 
1. Economic perspectives 
In addition to the externality problems mentioned earli-
er,85 other economic problems surround the absolute use ex-
83. Though moral failures may also exist, this article does not attempt to ex-
plore moral bases for private land use regulation. For one scholar's efforts . to define 
the ethical or moral bases of environmental regulation, see Mark Sagoff, Where 
Ickes Went Right or Reason and Rationality in Environmental Law, 14 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 265 (1987) [hereinafter Sagoff, Reason and Rationality], and Sagoff, supra note 
58. 
84. For further discussion of constitutionally protected property rights, see infra 
notes 99-117, 129-57 and accompanying text. 
85. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. 
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pectation of the traditional property system. High transaction 
costs and inefficient land value discounting, for example, can be 
associated with the exploitative approach to private land use. 
Without government land use regulation, private landowners 
generally would not be able to control their neighbors' land 
uses. Although private nuisance actions would provide some 
relief, these actions generally would not be effective against an 
offending land use having a widespread effect. 86 A private 
landowner would hesitate to bring such an action when other 
landowners would benefit from a successful lawsuit without 
paying for any of its costs. Furthermore, if a private landowner 
tried instead to form an association of landowners to deal with 
the problem, the landowner would face formidable transaction 
costs-that is, the costs of transacting with the numerous land-
owners in the affected area and ultimately with the offending 
landowner. 87 In a world without land use regulation, a private 
landowner would want to discount the value of the expected 
gain from a possible land use to reflect the probability that the 
gain will be less because of the uses of neighboring landowners. 
This discounting might, in turn, cause the landowner to choose 
a less efficient land use option. 88 Thus, even a purely private 
perspective suggests the need to limit private ownership rights 
by land use regulation. 
The traditional view of land as an economic resource is 
also problematic.89 Although interests in land can, like other 
property interests, be bought or sold in the marketplace, land 
differs from typical marketplace goods in ways that justify 
recognition of a stronger public interest. Besides being 
nonmovable and fixed in supply, land also is an important 
86. See James E. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Con-
ceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429, 443-59 (1971) (discussing some of the 
limitations of a judicial approach to pollution control). See generally MANDELKER, 
supra note 2, §§ 4.02-.15 (discussing judicial zoning through nuisance actions). For 
an article arguing that a more privatized and less centralized system of land use 
control is superior to zoning in promoting efficiency and equity, see Robert C. 
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land 
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973). 
87. For further discussion of the free rider and transaction costs problems, see 
Krier, supra note 86, at 443-49. 
88. For an example of such discounting, see POSNER, supra note 26, § 3.1, at 
32. But cf. Ellickson, supra note 86 (arguing that a privatized system of land use 
control is superior to zoning in promoting efficiency). 
89. Although the shortcomings of this traditional view are well accepted, 
scholars still debate the implications of those shortcomings. Furthermore, the view 
still appears to be -prevalent among private landowners. See supra note 58. 
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source of life. In addition, the land valuation process poses 
significant problems. Exaggerated land prices often result from 
the land valuation process because land is not fungible and 
must therefore be valued through a practice of community ex-
trapolation; that is, land values generally are set by looking at 
the market prices of comparable tracts of land in the communi-
ty.90 Overinflated land values also may occur because private 
parties speculate about the development potential of a tract of 
land and ignore its existence value. 91 Because property law 
has traditionally protected the reasonable expectations of land-
owners92 and because the existence value of land reflects frag-
ile ecological values for which there is no established mar-
ket, 93 marketplace transactions have generally failed to reflect 
the full value of preserving land in its natural state. Finally, 
the traditional view of land as an economic resource is based 
on an assumption of abundance that is no longer valid. While 
the discovery of North America and the rest of the New World 
may have temporarily justified this assumption, tremendous 
growth and development over hundreds of years have made the 
fmiteness of land and other natural resources painfully 
clear.94 
For a variety of economic reasons, then, the traditional use 
expectations of private landowners fail to promote the protec-
tion of common resources available for public use either be-
cause private rights cannot be effectively recognized or because 
the resources are vital to the public's survival and well-being. 
Unless private landowners are forced to consider the third 
party costs of their land use decisions, the landowners have no 
incentive to protect common resources affected by their uses. 
Af3 Hardin explained in. his famous article The Tragedy of the 
Commons, individual users of common resources will not exer-
cise self-restraint to restrict their own use if others do not take 
similar action; nor will they voluntarily incur costs to preserve 
the commons. No single user would be willing to pursue such 
management and preservation efforts without guarantees of 
90. See John A. Hum.bach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 
362 n.74 (1989). 
91. For a discussion of the development and existing-use components of land 
market values, see id. at 362-69, and Large, supra note 11, at 1078-81. 
92. See supra notes 14-30 and accompanying text. 
93. See Large, supra note 11, at 1080-81. 
94. See OPHULS, supra note 74, ·at 8-9. 
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reciprocal action by other commoners who would benefit from 
the efforts. 95 
By imposing a legal obligation on private landowners to 
cooperate in preserving common resources, the law would be 
following some basic principles of economics.96 Under the eco-
nomic perspectives discussed above, this obligation would re-
quire landowners to recognize the legitimacy and significance of 
the public interest in preserving common resources-at least to 
the extent necessary to avert the tragedy of the commons. Rec-
ognition of the public interest would, in turn, mean accepting 
reasonable land use restrictions designed to internalize private 
land use costs, minimize inefficient land value discounting, and 
readjust land use practices to reflect present resource condi-
tions and existence and other environmental values. 97 As a 
general matter, landowners bearing this duty to cooperate 
should not be able to successfully raise takings challenges to 
well-tailored and broad-based restrictions when the restrictions 
leave the landowner with economically viable use and help to 
preserve common resources that are available for public use 
either because of the impracticality of recognizing private 
rights or because of the importance of the resources to the 
public's survival and well-being. 98 
2. Political theory perspectives 
Political theory problems also surround the traditional use 
expectations of private landowners. Although these expecta-
tions find some support in the prominence of property rights in 
the Constitution, 99 the traditional expectations of exploitation 
95. Hardin, supra note 63, at 1244-45. 
96. See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 59, at 92-108 (discussing the 
benefits of cooperation). For an argument for compelled cooperation, see Charles H. 
Koch Jr., Cooperative Surplus: The Effzciency Justification for Active Government, 
31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 431 (1990). Although recognition of private property 
rights is the solution generally advanced to avert the tragedy of the commons, this 
solution will not work for the special category of common resources identified 
above-that is, resources available for public use because private rights cannot 
effectively be recognized or because the resources are vital to the public's well-
being. Indeed, private users are a principal reason for the deterioration of this 
category of common resources. See Hardin, supra note 63, at 1245. 
97. For a discussion of existence value and of environmental valuation general-
ly, see PEARCE & TURNER, supra note 58, at 120-58, 320-41. 
98. For further discussion of the takings implications of land use restrictions, 
see infra notes 145-57 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text. 
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and absolute use define the concept of constitutionally protect-
ed property in a way that is inaccurate and unnecessarily re-
strictive under political theory perspectives. No single political 
view should control the definition of key fundamental rights 
absent clear evidence to the contrary. Such an approach is 
dangerous because, among other reasons, it places tremendous 
power in the hands of the decisionmaker who chooses the con-
trolling political viewpoint. 
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, at least two 
political camps played crucial roles. One camp, the 
Madisonians or federalists, basically believed in the fundamen-
tal importance of individual rights like private property owner-
ship. Fearing government abuse of individuals, Madisonians 
urged the adoption of a strong individual rights approach to 
constitutional interpretation.100 A second camp, the Jefferso-
nians or republicans, also believed in the importance of proper-
ty and other individual rights, but had less fear of collective ac-
tion. The Jeffersonians thus placed a higher premium on pro-
moting the collective interest and believed that property rights 
were held subject to the greater social good.101 Though the 
Takings Clause was the product of the Madisonian camp, 102 
the inclusion of the clause in the Constitution cannot-and 
shoUld not-be interpreted as a total vindication of the 
Madisonian political view. The drafting and adoption of the 
Constitution required numerous political compromises, some of 
which meant modification or rejection of Madisonian ide-
als.103 Although the Constitution clearly adopted the basic po-
litical concept of democracy, the actual political content of par-
ticular provisions is far from clear. 
What is clear is that the framers did not draft a document 
of governance binding private parties to any one political view 
of property. Nor did they provide for absolute or near absolute 
protection of property lights. To the contrary, the framers were 
reacting to the concentration of absolute property rights in a 
privileged class and were trying to protect against the sover-
eign powers that emanate from such rights.104 A cursory ex-
100. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying texi.. But cf. Sagoff, Reason and 
Rationality, supra note 83, at 290-91 (associating Madison with the republican 
view, perhaps because of his position on federaJ/state relations). For a thoughtful 
examination of the Madisoniru1 camp, see NEDEIBKY, supra note 43. 
101. Anderson, supra note 42, at 531-33. 
102. ld. at 534. 
103. See id. 
104. This reaction may explain the rejection of a federalist proposal to restrict 
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amination of other key property provisions in the Constitution 
demonstrates this point. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the Constitution prohibit government deprivations of 
property without due process of law.105 The clear implication 
of the due process guarantee is that the framers anticipated 
lawful government deprivations of property, authorizing them 
as long as due process was provided. An absolutist view of 
property generally ignores the distinction between legitimate 
due process deprivations of property and compensable takings. 
Furthermore, in drafting the Constitution, the framers 
relied on some basic common law concepts that involved a 
public interest dimension. One of those concepts-private 
property106-had already evolved by the time of drafting to 
the point where a public interest perspective had become bound 
up with property rights. Early land distribution laws, for exam-
ple, regularly imposed public interest conditions on private 
parties applying for land grants.107 By the 1600s, English 
common law had begun to recognize a public interest in certain 
critical tidal resources. 108 American courts would eventually 
rely on that interest to develop a doctrine that imposed limita-
tions on both government and the private waterfront landown-
er.109 Consistent with this public interest perspective on prop-
erty, government traditionally exercised wide latitude in regu-
the election of one house of the legislature to the propertied class. See generally id. 
at 532-34 (discussing the federalist proposal, as well as Franklin's response to a 
similar proposal for the Pennsylvania Constitution). During the colonial period, the 
Crown had attempted to maintain control of the social, political, and economic 
structure of the colonies in part through their land grant systems. See, e.g., BUT-
LER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 14, § 8.1 (discussing the land grant system and 
policies of colonial Virginia). 
For a discussion of the "sovereignty function" of property, see C. Edwin Baker, 
Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 
741, 769-74 (1986). 
105. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
106. The Supreme Court generally looks to state law to define property when 
evaluating takings claims. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 
480 U.S. 470, 518-19 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 
449 u.s. 155, 161 (1980). 
107. Laws governing the distribution of private interests in land historically 
were used to promote a variety of public policies. See, e.g., BUTLER & LMNGSTON, 
supra note 14, ch. 8 (discussing the provisions and policies of land distribution 
laws enacted in Virginia during the colonial and early statehood periods). 
108. See id. § 5.1.B (discussing the English law origins of the public trust doc-
trine). 
109. See id. § 5.2 (discussing the emergence of the public trust doctrine in 
American courts). 
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lating property. 110 Though this perspective may not be as evi-
dent today, perhaps because of the discontinuance of the land 
grant process,111 the public interest perspective nevertheless 
remains bound up with the private property concept. 112 
Traditional land use expectations thus ignore some impor-
tant political theory perspectives. In drafting the Constitution, 
the framers were trying to ensure freedom of political thought 
and action. One device used to achieve this goal was the con-
cept of constitutionally protected property. Interpreting that 
device as impliedly adopting any one political view of our con-
stitutional democracy would undermine the goal of political 
freedom. Such an interpretation would also require an insight 
into the framers~ state of mind and their drafting 
process-which is virtually impossible to obtain. Though many 
different political views for interpreting constitutional provi-
sions exist, the Constitution can only realistically be seen as a 
political compromise intended to promote a wide range of 
views. Such a compromise requires a holistic approach to defin-
ing private land use exp,3ctations. 
Nor should the concept of constitutionally protected proper-
ty be interpreted as excluding a public interest component. The 
constitutional concept of property depends in large part on the 
common law concept of property, which long ago developed a 
public interest dimension. Although reasonable people may 
debate the extent of this dimension, its existence makes sense 
from political theory perspectives. 113 To the extent that pri-
vate property rights are supposed to serve political values, it 
seems logical to recognh~e public interests in private resources 
to promote those values when the private system fails to do 
so. 114 Though it may be difficult to reach a consensus on 
110. See Anderson, supra note 42, at 537. 
111. Virginia, for example, effectively abolished the land grant system in 1952. 
BUTLER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 14, § 8.4, at 283. 
112. The public interest in ce·rtain tidal resources, for example, still remains an 
important restriction on private waterfront landowners. See, e.g., id. § 5.2.C (dis-
cussing the extent to which pul:,lic trust rights infringe on private rights). A relat-
ed concept, the commons concept, also recognizes the public interest in certain 
coastal resources and poses prc·blems for waterfront landowners in some jurisdic-
tions. See generally id. ch. 6 (discussing the development of the commons concept 
in England and Virginia); in.fra note 145 (discussing ( ommon law grounds for limit-
ing private property to promote the public interest). 
113. For further discussion of the political justifications for public rights, see 
Lynda L. Butler, En.viron.mental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Prop-
erty, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 323, 363-65, 372-74 (1990). 
114. For sources discussing the political importance of private property rights, 
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when these failures exist, some of the more compelling cases 
arguably can be identified.115 A public interest in private 
property, for example, may deserve recognition when use of the 
private property is threatening a common resource and that re-
source is so vital that public interest recognition is needed to 
preserve order and maintain our democratic system of govern-
ment. Or a public interest limiting private property rights may 
merit recognition when private use interferes with a resource 
that is closely linked to fundamental political rights-much like 
the public interest in navigable waters merits protection 
against interference by private waterfront landowners because 
of the interest's link to the right to travel.116 Recognition of 
the public interest in private land use, in other words, may be-
come necessary under political theory perspectives when the 
private property system fails to allocate interests in resources 
consistent with fundamental political ideology. Such recognition 
would serve an important legitimating function-legitimating 
government action taken to promote the public interest in pri-
vate land use. 117 
3. Ecological perspectives 
Ecological perspectives also suggest that the traditional 
expectation of exploitative use is no longer viable or reasonable. 
As explained earlier, American society traditionally viewed 
land as an economic resource-a commodity to be exchanged in 
the marketplace.118 Current scientific understandings of our 
ecosystem clearly indicate that this view is myopic. Besides 
limiting the scope of land use decisions to the physical bound-
aries of privately owned land, the traditional view also ignores 
the ecological value of land.119 Proponents of economic theory 
see id. at 363 n.199. 
115. For a discussion of political justifications for public rights in instream uses, 
see id. at 372-74. 
116. For further explanation of the political justifications for a public interest in 
navigation that limits private waterfront landowners, see id. at 372. 
117. For further discussion of this legitimating function, see Butler, supra note 
6, at 857-58. 
118. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
119. See David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for 
Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 332-36 (1988) (critiquing the traditional view from an 
ecological perspective). See generally LYNTON K. CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHAL-
LENGE FOR MODERN SOCIETY 65-68, 80-87 (1970) (arguing for a holistic approach to 
environmental problems). For a discussion of environmental valuation, see PEARCE 
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generally recognize the need to consider costs and benefits in 
making resource allocation decisions. Yet, in applying this 
principle to private land use choices, many seem to focus only 
on traditional economic :factors having an established exchange 
value in the marketplace. The ecological value of land is left 
out of the traditional land use equation.120 
In opposing government's efforts to incorporate current 
scientific understandings into land use laws, private landown-
ers typically argue that changes in land use laws improperly 
disrupt settled expectations in violation of constitutionally 
protected property rights and that the laws unfairly force them 
to bear the burdens of public programs. Although these argu-
ments have some appeal given the private economic effects and 
the public benefits of land use laws, 1~1 the arguments fail to 
recognize the scientific motivations for environmental regula-
tion of land use. In addition to being driven by general public 
sentiment, ecological usH restrictions reflect growing scientific 
knowledge about the link between land use and the envi-
ronment. 122 As scientific evidence of the interdependence of 
natural resources increases, legal recognition of the public 
interest in privately ow:qed land becomes inevitable. 
Although private landowners may indeed bear some of the 
burdens of environmental programs adopted by the majority, 
the indiscriminate effects of private land use on common envi-
ronmental resources are forcing the majority to adopt these 
programs. Though individual landowners' expectations of gain 
may indeed· be upset, the social injustice of a tragedy of the 
commons seems far more compelling. If the problem of the 
commons is not rectified, it will eventually bring "ruin to 
all."123 The "tragedy of the commons, in its fully disastrous 
form, [admittedly] requires a political paralysis that prevents 
government from stopping the destruction of a resource."124 
The continuing vitality of the traditional expectation of exploit-
ative use and the hostile national political climate surrounding 
environmental programs125 suggest that this paralysis may 
& TuRNER, supra note 58, at 120-58, 320-41. 
120. For further criticism of economic perspectives on environmental problems, 
see Sagoff, supra note 58. 
121. For further discussion of these two factors, see infra notes 145-57 and ac-
companying text. 
122. See Hunter, supra note 119, at 313-15. 
123. Hardin, supra note 63, at 1244. 
124. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 59, at 187. 
125. Signs of this hostile political climate include the regulatory moratorium 
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already exist in the area of environmental regulation of land 
use. Because the Lucas decision relies in large part on tradi-
tiona! expectations and understandings of property owners, this 
paralysis appears, at the very least, to be reinforced by current 
takings law. Now more than ever, ecological necessity compels 
environmental regulation of land use. 126 
The economic, political, and scientific failures of the tradi-
tional approach to private property collectively suggest the 
need to recognize the public interest in privately owned land 
and to impose a social obligation on private landowners. This 
social obligation would force private landowners to bear some 
responsibility to society for the adverse effects of private land 
use decisions. As the economic, political, and scientific perspec-
tives suggest, it is only through the imposition of such an obli-
gation or duty that the law will correct the short-term, self-
interested perspective of private landowners. The nature and 
content of the obligation would .be defined by the democratic 
political process, 127 through the adoption of environmental 
and land use laws, and by the courts, through the reinterpreta-
tion of takings and property principles. Inherent in the concept 
of recognizing a social obligation is the principle of legitima-
tion; because landowners would bear a general obligation to 
account for some of the adverse effects of their land use deci-
sions, government action taken to promote the public interest 
and enforce the obligation generally would be legitimated by recogni-
tion of the social obligation. 128 Whether the constitutional 
concept of property would permit the imposition of a social 
obligation on landowners is a question considered in the next 
section. 
imposed by President Bush on federal regulations, see 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1289 
(Aug. 28, 1992); 22 id. at 2364-66 (Feb. 14, 1992); 22 id. at 2171-72 (Jan. 24, 
1992), and the activities of Quayle's Council on Competitiveness, see 22 id. at 
1969-70 (Dec. 13, 1991); 22 id. at 1820-21, 1837-38 (Nov. 29, 1991); 22 id. at 1787-
88 (Nov. 22, 1991). 
126. Hardin advances the ecological necessity argument as forcefully as any 
scholar. See Hardin, supra note 63. 
127. For a discussion of the need to make environmental decisions through the 
democratic political process, see Daniel A. Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's 
Theorem, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 337. 
128. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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B. Defining the Reasonable Expectations 
of Constitutionally Protected Property 
Consistent with the Constitution's reliance on preexisting 
law, courts and commentators have recognized that the concept 
of constitutionally protected property is governed in part by 
state law. Defining the reasonable expectations of constitution-
ally protected property therefore requires some consideration of 
common law principles of property law.129 Two perspectives of 
the common law merit attention: first, the private law perspec-
tive found in property disputes between private parties; and 
second, the public law perspective arising in conflicts between 
public and private parties. 130 The premise for resolving dis-
putes under both perspectives is the well-accepted proposition 
that property rights are, by definition, a product of the legal 
system.131 
1. The private law perspective 
Several overriding guidelines for defining the reasonable 
expectations of constitutionally protected property emerge from 
the common law principles governing property disputes be-
tween private parties. One guideline concerns the relational 
approach to property that developed at common law. Under 
that approach, property rights sometimes vary according to the 
facts and circumstances surrounding conflicting private 
claims.132 One obvious example under the common law is the 
"finders principle," which gives a finder superior rights as 
against everyone but the true owner. Under this principle, a 
fmder would prevail against a subsequent possessor of the lost 
property but would lose to the true owner if she returned to 
claim the property.133 
129. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See generally Frank I. 
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097' 
(1981) (discussing different methods of defining constitutionally protected property). 
130. Neither perspective is entirely exclusive of the other. No private land mat-
ter, for example, can be purely private since decisions shape public choices and 
values. Conversely, government ]and use restrictions are often imposed to protect 
established private uses from other potentially conflicting private uses. 
131. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: 
Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 341-42. 
132. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 68, §§ 1.2-.3 (discussing the relational 
n&ture of property rights). 
133. See generally RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 3.1, 3.5 
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Another example concerns the common law reasonable use 
rule governing water use by waterfront landowners in many 
eastern jurisdictions.134 Such a landowner, known as a ripari-
an proprietor, generally has the right to make reasonable use 
of a watercourse located adjacent to his waterfront property, 
but that right is subject to a similar correlative right existing 
in other riparians along the same watercourse. 135 Whether a 
use is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of a 
situation; a use that once was reasonable may become unrea-
sonable over time as conditions change.136 Some of the factors 
affecting the reasonableness of a use include normal and cur-
rent stream conditions, weather conditions, the purpose of the 
use, the quantity o:£ water required by the use, and that use's 
compatibility with other uses.137 Thus, for example, reason-
able uses conducted when water levels are normal may become 
unreasonable during periods of low flow. Further, the reason-
ableness of a use will vary according to a riparian's location 
along a watercourse; a riparian may hf;!ve superior use rights 
as against riparians below him and inferior interests as against 
riparians above him. 138 Like the finders principle, then, the 
reasonable use rule does not define private property rights 
absolutely or constantly, but rather varies the rights according 
to the nature of other conflicting private interests. 
A second guideline concerns the common law approach to 
defining a property owner's reasonable expectation of gain. 
Under the common law, property ownership includes the right 
to a reasonable expectation of gain, known traditionally as the 
right to make a livelihood, and more recently as the right to 
take economic gambles.139 The existence of this right does not 
guarantee, however, that the gamble will pay off. The property 
owner does not have a legally protected right guaranteeing her 
a return on her investment; unilateral participation in the 
marketplace is not a sufficient basis for recognizing a property 
(3d ed. 1975) (discussing the rights of finders of lost goods). 
134. See generally Butler, supra note 28 (discussing the reasonable use rule and 
other common law principles still governing water use in many eastern states). 
135. Id. at 105-07. 
136. Id. at 130. 
137. Id. at 126. 
138. See id. at 106-07, 126-27. For further discussion of the reasonable use rule 
and for suggestions for change, see id. at 125-37. 
139. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918); 
Keeble v. Hickeringill, 88 Eng. Rep. 945 (Q.B. 1707); Kehle v. Hickeringell, 25 Eng. 
Rep. 610 (Q.B. 1707); Friedman, supra note 131, at 345. 
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right in the anticipated return. Though the law protects proper-
ty owners from unfair competition, it generally does not protect 
them from fair competitive practices, not even when the losing 
owners were first-in-time or when the practices caused proper-
ty owners to lose their entire investment.140 
A third guideline involves the judiciary's power to change 
common law rules. Though some courts are reluctant to over-
turn common law rules, especially when private parties have 
r1alied on those rules, the courts generally have recognized their 
power to change rules that no longer make sense. The New 
l\tfexico judiciary, for example, declared that it would not adopt 
common law rules that did not apply to current conditions and 
circumstances and had "reached a point of obsolescence."141 
The court explained that adherence to property rules which 
have "no justification or support in modern society'' would be a 
"'revolting'" form of" 'blind imitation.' "142 A California court 
went even further, deciding to retroactively reject a common 
law rule that had app~ied under its state law. In determining 
that retroactive application was appropriate, the court balanced 
"the injustice which would result from . . . [following the old 
rule] against the injustice, if any, which might result by failing 
to give effect to reliance on the old rule and the policy against 
disturbing settled" rights .. 143 
These guidelines establish a common law basis for limiting 
property rights in disputes between private parties and demon-
strate that property rights are relative as between private 
parties. Under the first guideline the concept of property be-
comes, in effect, a set of relations which vary over time. Be-
cause of those relations, property rights never are totally abso-
lute or predictable. Under the second guideline the property 
concept incorporates the notion of economic gambles-that is, 
the idea that property owners generally accept the risks of 
uncertainty and change in the marketplace. Finally, the third 
guideline demonstrates that the property concept includes the 
notion of principled changes in common law rules. Because the 
140. For the Supreme Court's attempt to defme unfair competition, see Interna-
tional News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-46 (1918). 
141. Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600 P.2d 278, 280 (N.M. 1979). 
142. Id. at 281 (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. 
REV. 457, 469 (1897)). In the court's view, the doctrine of destructibility of contin-
gent remainders met this standard. 
143. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 498 P.2d 987, 991 
(Cal. 1972) (footnote omitted). 
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three guidelines all address the basic nature of common law 
property rights, the guidelines should apply to disputes involv-
ing constitutionally protected property. As the Supreme Court 
concluded in Lucas, a regulation eliminating all economically 
viable use would constitute a taking unless the regulation was 
based on limitations inherent in the landowner's title or in 
background principles of a state's property or nuisance law.144 
As part of the background principles of property law, the three 
guidelines establish ways to limit private property rights that 
are inherent in those rights. Lucas suggests the possibility of 
applying similar notions of relativity to constitutionally pro-
tected property. 
2. The public law perspective 
Earlier discussions of private land use expectations and 
property disputes between private parties offer justifications for 
recognizing the public interest in private land use. The discus-
sion of private land use expectations suggests that the exploit-
ative view of property has serious economic, political, and eco-
logical shortcomings which justify recognition of the public 
interest in privately owned land. By recognizing the public 
interest in appropriate private land use contexts, the law could 
correct some of these shortcomings. The discussion of the law 
governing property disputes between private parties demon-
strates a common law basis for limiting private property and 
suggests that, contrary to the implications of the absolute use 
expectation, the relativity concept generally governs such prop-
erty disputes.145 The key inquiry in defining the reasonable 
144. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992). 
145. The common law also provides some grounds for limiting private property 
rights for the purpose of promoting the public interest. Long ago the courts began 
to recognize and protect public rights in certain valuable resources, sometimes even 
when the resources were privately owned. See generally BUTLER & LMNGSTON, 
supra note 14, chs. 5, 6 (discussing two public rights theories: the "public trust 
doctrine" and the "commons concept"). Although the doctrine used to promote the 
public interest varies according to the factual and jurisdictional context, the notion 
of subordinating private property rights to certain public interests is not foreign to 
the common law. For examples of such subordination, see id. § 20.2, at 750·57. 
Indeed, at least in the context of navigable waters, the public interest has achieved 
constitutional stature. As the Supreme Court explained years ago, navigable water-
ways are essential to commerce and thus, under the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution, are impressed with a navigable servitude in the public that generally is 
superior to the property rights of waterfront landowners. See United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404-05 (1940); Lewis Blue Point Oyster 
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1913); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
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expectations of constitutionally protected property thus be-
comes whether the constitutional implications of the property 
concept necessitate protection of the traditional expectation of 
exploitative use despite its current problems and limitations. 
Two aspects of modem land use laws appear, at least on 
the surface, to be particularly troubling under constitutional 
principles: the laws' economic impact on private landowners 
and the laws' creation or promotion of a public benefit. Propo-
nents of the exploitative view generally believe that landowners 
should receive compensation for economic loss caused by gov-
ernment regulation of land use. Advocates of this view appar-
ently reason that the concept of constitutionally protected prop-
erty includes economic expectations formed under earlier laws. 
They also believe that the creation of a public benefit at a 
landowner's expense is at the core of the Takings Clause and 
that under the clause government must pay to achieve such a 
1oublic benefit.146 Both aspects must be evaluated before the 
reasonable expectations. of constitutionally protected property 
can be properly defined. 
Because adverse economic impact results from virtually all 
land use regulations, a takings standard based primarily on the 
existence of economic harm would be troubling. Such a stan-
dard would invalidate most, if not all, land use regulations 
enacted without payment of just compensation and would make 
environmental preservation and resource management pro-
grams costly propositions. A taking3 standard based in part on 
the degree of harm to reasonable economic expectations would 
be far less troubling. 147 Under such a standard, courts would 
Wheat.) 1, 190, 197 (1824). Thus, to the extent that common law principles are 
important in deflning constitutionally protected property, those principles suggest 
that, in certain resource contexts, the absolute use expectation is unreasonable. 
146. · Both factors were involved in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 
S. Ct. 2886 (1992). In Lucas, a waterfront landowner argued that an environmental 
regulation prohibiting new construction on his beachfront property constituted a 
taking because the regulation deprived him of all economically viable use. The 
landowner also argued that the coastal law was enacted to promote public beneflts 
like tourism and public beach use, not to prevent public harm. See 60 U.S.L.W. 
3609 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1992) (summarizing oral arguments before the Court). 
147. Traditional case law supports the focus on degree, as opposed to existence, 
of economic harm. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). A takings 
standard that focused solely on the degr!!e of economic harm, however, would also 
be troubling. For a discussion of some reasons why, see supra notes 56-67, 85-95 
and accompanying text. 
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examine the degree of economic harm, along with other tradi-
tional takings factors. These factors may include the reason-
ableness of the affected landowner's expectation of gain and the 
nature and importance of the government interest.148 Though 
the case for payment of just compensation would be far more 
compelling when a regulation deprives a landowner of all eco-
nomically viable use, even a total or near total economic loss 
might be upheld if a regulated use raises serious public health, 
welfare, or safety concerns or constitutes a nuisance.149 
Most land use laws, however, do not deprive landowners of 
all economically viable use and thus present more difficult 
cases. To the extent that these laws make partial readjust-
ments of economic values and interests between public and 
private parties, the economic perspectives discussed earlier 
suggest that the readjustments are, as a general proposition, 
legitimate. Forcing private landowners to internalize more of 
the costs of private land use should not, in the abstract, require 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court used a takings 
test that focuses almost exclusively on the degree of economic harm when govern-
ment action causes a futal deprivation of economically viable use. The only inquiry 
permitted in such a situation is to determine whether the government action is 
based on limitations that inhere in the landowner's title or in property or nuisance 
law. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-900, 2901-02 (1992). 
148. When government action totally deprives a landowner of all economically 
viable use, the Supreme Court does not appear to permit consideration of the na-
ture of the government interest. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the 
Court concluded that such a situation merited "categorical treatment" as a taking 
and ruled out "case-specific inquiry infu the public interest advanced in support of 
the restraint." 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). The Court, however, suggested that 
government could be absolved of liability for a compensable taking if it acted to 
"forestall . . . wave threats to the lives and property of others." Id. at 2900 n.16 
(citing Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 (1880)). 
149. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 
123 U.S. 623 (1887). But cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 
2886, 2897-99 (1992) (describing Hadacheck, Mugler, and other cases using " 'harm-
ful or noxious use' analysis " as early attempts to develop takings theory and as 
inappropriate tools for resolving total deprivation cases). Even in the recent deci-
sion Lucas v. South Carolina · Coastal Council, the Court appears to recognize the 
possibility of total deprivation cases that do not require compensation because of 
serious health, welfare, or safety concerns. See id. at 2900 n.16 (suggesting that 
government may be absolved of liability in total deprivation cases if government 
acted to "forestall . . . grave threats to the lives and property of others"). 
The Supreme Court appears to have recognized a landowner's constitutionally 
protected right to make a reasonable return on his property. See Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 136 (1978). This article is not 
considering the validity or desirability of that position; rather the article seeks to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of changes in rules of law made without payment of 
just compensation to affected property owners under general takings and property 
principles. 
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compensation. Mter all, those costs are generally attributable 
to private landowners, a.nd, to the extent that the costs dimin-
ish the value of common resources, private land use impairs 
third party interests. Thus, land use regulations that do not 
deprive a landowner of all economically viable use generally 
should be viewed as reasonable accommodations of private and 
public interests under the Takings Clause when the regulations 
are forcing the internalization of private land use costs and are 
not singling out a particular landowner, as opposed to a partic-
ular type of land use, to bear a disproportionate amount of 
those costs. 
Ecological and political perspectives also support the gener-
al legitimacy of partial economic adjustments caused by envi-
ronmental regulation of land use. Under ecological and political 
perspectives, a land us~e regulation that attempts to correct 
some of the scientific failures of the private property system 
should at least be legitimate when the regulation does not 
deprive a landowner of all economically viable use. Constitu-
tional protection of scientifically inaccurate interests like the 
absolute use expectation makes little sense when the appropri-
ate corrective government action would not deprive a property 
owner of all economic use and would not unfairly single out a 
particular landowner. As we learn more about this world, we 
should be able to incorporate that knowledge into laws without 
having to compensate for every adverse economic impact. Sci-
entific knowledge provides an objective basis for redefining 
private property rights and thus minimizes many of the fears 
about arbitrary majoritarian exploitation underlying the Tak-
ings Clause. 150 
Furthermore, given the serious ramifications of the prob-
lem of resource scarcity/51 scientific perspectives also suggest 
that ecologically necessary land use regulations may, depend-
ing on the degree of need, withstand constitutional scrutiny 
150. Some scholars have criticized scientific principles and methodology as giving 
a false sense of objectivity and have argued that science is not as value-neutral as 
many suggest. See, e.g., Sagoff, Reason and Rationality, supra note 83, at 301-08. 
Even accepting the limitations of the scientific method, science still is objective to 
the extent that it generates data about and otherwise explains our global ecosys-
tem. 
For further discussion of the antimajoritarian basis of the Takings Clause, see 
Michelman, supra note 28, at 1214-18. 
151. For further discussion of these ramifications, see Hardin, supra note 63, 
and OPHULS, supra note 'Z4. 
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even when a landowner is deprived of all economically viable 
use. Even the Court in Lucas recognized the possibility of total 
deprivation cases that do not require compensation because of 
serious public health, welfare, or safety concerns. In explaining 
possible justifications .for government action depriving private 
property owners of all economically viable use, Justice Scalia 
noted that government may be "absolv[ed] . .. of liability for 
the destruction of 'real or personal property, in cases of actual 
necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall other 
grave threats to the lives and property of others."152 Because 
of the disastrous consequences of the tragedy of the commons 
and because of the overall tenor of the Lucas decision, which 
solidifies the paralysis that has slowly overtaken governmental 
units attempting to deal with environmental problems, 153 the 
grave threats exception should be interpreted to include serious 
environmental or resource problems. Furthermore, the constitu-
tional reasonableness of private land use expectations should 
be determined, in large part, from the facts, conditions, and cir-
cumstances existing at the time a land use decision is actually 
made, and not at the time of purchase.154 Such an approach 
would be consistent with notions of relativity, which are part of 
the background principles of property and which establish the 
variability and adaptability of property over time. The law 
should not continue to protect private expectations based on 
invalid assumptions or obsolete facts and circumstances. Con-
tinued protection of inaccurate facts and circumstances would 
raise the possibility of ecological and social disaster. , 
Because a public benefit also results from virtually all land 
use regulations, the private landowners' reliance on the exis-
tence of a public benefit to support their compensation claim is 
also misplaced. Indeed, government regulations must produce 
some sort of "public benefit" to be valid. Under the Due Process 
Clauses of the Constitution, government can generally, exercise 
152. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 n.16 (1992) 
{quoting Bowdib:h v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 {1880)). 
153. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
154. Such an approach would be consistent with Hardin's principle of morality. 
See Hardin, supra note 63, at 1245. The suggested approach would, however, 
appear to be contrary to the language of some Supreme Court opinions, which 
refer to the importance of protecting "investment-backed expectations" under the 
Takings Clause. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 
124 (1978). This language suggests that the time of investment (often the time of 
purchase) is the key time for evaluating the constitutional validity of private land 
use expectations. 
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its police power to regulate its citizens and resources if the 
resulting law reasonably promotes the public health, welfare, 
safety, and morals. 155 1'hus, Justice Scalia's concern in Lucas 
over whether "private property is being pressed into some form 
of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public 
harm"156 provides little guidance in resolving takings cases. 
Economic and ecological perspectives suggest that this concern 
with the creation of a public benefit is one-sided and simplistic . 
. Among other considerations, those focusing on the creation of a 
public benefit are ignoring the fact that the public benefit re-
t1ects a value that the public attaches to common resources 
adversely affected by the conduct of private landowners-a 
value that the private marketplace does not adequately consid-
er. Forcing private actors in the marketplace to consider that 
value seems to be the type of rational economic adjustment 
that the law should allow. Additionally, Justice Scalia and 
private landowners are ignoring scientific evidence establishing 
the detrimental impact of land use on the ecosystem. The 
harmful effects of land use have left government with little 
choice; government must adopt more stringent environmental 
land use regulations if it wants to avoid serious ecological prob-
lems. Scientific perspectives thus suggest a more complete view 
of environmental regulation of land use; in addition to produc-
ing a public benefit, the regulations are minimizing the ecologi-
cal costs of private land use. Though a public benefit admit-
tedly results, that beneJ5.t cannot help but arise, given the in-
terrelatedness of resources. 
A more accurate and more appropriate focus under the 
Takings Clause would be to determine whether land use regu-
lations have widespread effect. If the public benefit is created 
at the expense of a few landowners who have been singled out 
to bear the burdens of a public program, then the takings ques-
tion is much more troubling. In such a situation, the fear of 
majoritarian exploitation of individual property owners be-
. comes quite real; the few landowners who are affected by the 
regulation may legitimately wonder whether government is 
trying to "get them." Unless the scope of the regulation can be 
155. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88, 395-97 
(1926). See generally MANDELKl)R, supra note 2, §§ 2.35-.37 (discussing land use 
controls under this traditional due process test). 
156. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894-95 (1992). 
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explained rationally from a scientific perspective, the regula-
tion would likely fail to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Most land use regulations, however, do not single out a few 
landowners, but rather spread out the burdens among broad-
based classes of landowners. Political perspectives suggest that 
these land use regulations generally should withstand a tak-
ings challenge based on the public benefit argument so long as 
they result from democratically responsive government. As long 
as the burdens are spread out, landowners should not feel like 
victims of the majority. Fears of majoritarian exploitation are 
minimized when affected landowners can see that eventually 
the benefits and burdens of government regulation offset each 
other.157 
N . CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, economic, political, and ecological perspec-
tives provide a basis for incorporating the concept of relativity 
into the definition of constitutionally protected property. These 
perspectives are es.pecially important to the modem concept of 
constitutionally protected property because they promote the 
development of a more holistic view of land use--a view that is 
sorely needed in these times of deteriorating and scarce natural 
resources. More particularly, the perspectives reveal that the 
traditional view of property, especially as reflected in the ab-
solute use expectation, is not a viable approach to defining 
private land use rights under constitutional or common law. 
Besides ignoring legitimate third party interests in common 
resources, the absolute use expectation reflects a view of the 
world that is scientifically antiquated and politically one-sided. 
By focusing on the failures of the exploitative use expecta-
tion, lawmakers have a basis for interpreting constitutionally 
protected property rights as relative to the overall economic, 
political, and ecological picture. Significantly, this basis would 
allow government to recognize the public interest in privately 
owned land by adopting regulations to correct some of the fail-
ures of the private rights system. Under the public interest 
perspective, government would not, as a general proposition, 
have to pay just compensation to landowners affected by care-
fully tailored corrective regulations. 
157. See Michelman, supra note 28, at 1179, 1222-23, 1255. 
